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studies has now established cases that show a very selective read-
ing deficit parallel in nature to acquired dyslexias (Stuart & How-
ard 1995; Temple 1984; 1997; Temple & Marshall 1983).
Peripheral dyslexias, which have been less widely explored with
respect to developmental origin, also show modular impairments
in developmental forms. Letter position dyslexia (LPD), a selec-
tive deficit in letter position encoding with unimpaired letter iden-
tification, was initially reported in acquired cases (Friedmann &
Gvion 2001). This dyslexia has now been identified in 12 Hebrew-
speaking children and adolescents whose reading patterns show
striking similarities to acquired LPD (Friedmann & Gvion 2002;
Friedmann & Rahamim 2002; Precel & Friedmann 2002).
Both acquired and developmental LPD manifest modular im-
pairment, as only one submodule of the visual analysis system, let-
ter position encoding, is impaired, whereas another submodule,
letter identification, is unimpaired. Both in acquired and in de-
velopmental LPD, individuals show the dissociation between
making predominantly letter migration errors within words (read-
ing “bread” for “beard”) and very few or no letter substitutions in
a wide variety of tasks. In reading aloud, individuals with acquired
LPD had 21% letter-order errors and only 1% letter substitutions;
individuals with developmental LPD had 15% letter-order errors
and 1% letter substitutions. In a same-different task, individuals
in both groups could detect differences in letter identity between
words but failed to detect letter-order differences: The individu-
als with acquired LPD made 48% errors in letter order but only
7% errors in letter identification; the 12 individuals with develop-
mental LPD had 37% versus 4% errors.
Moreover, exactly the same pattern of migration errors occurs
in acquired and developmental LPD. In both cases the migration
errors occur almost exclusively in medial-letter positions. In word
reading and definition tasks, individuals with acquired LPD made
16% medial-letter position errors, compared to 0.01% exterior-
letter position errors. Similarly, the individuals with developmen-
tal LPD had 15.1% medial errors and 0.8% exterior errors.
However, many of the individuals with developmental dyslexias
show errors in addition to the errors that characterize their read-
ing deficits. We argue that these stem from their incomplete or-
thographic-lexical knowledge because of incomplete and flawed
input to the lexicon and lack of sufficient exposure to written
words and texts that is only a side effect of their reading impair-
ment. For example, the individuals with developmental LPD also
showed, in addition to letter migrations, 5.7% errors in reading
aloud that resulted from insufficient lexical-orthographic knowl-
edge: They made errors on heterographic homophones (or het-
erophones with homophonic letters), which can be read correctly
only after being lexicalized, as well as regularization errors and er-
rors of the vocalic pattern of unvoweled words (in Hebrew, vow-
els are underrepresented, and so lexical knowledge is required for
reading). The same was true for the Hebrew-speaking neglect-
dyslexic child in Friedmann and Nachman-Katz (in press), who
made neglect errors in 50% of the words. He too had homophone
and vocalic-pattern errors that are not characteristic of the read-
ing of individuals with acquired neglect dyslexia. These error types
were not found in the reading of the individuals with acquired
LPD in Friedmann and Gvion (2001) or in acquired neglect
dyslexia, probably because the onset of the dyslexia in the acquired
cases followed reading acquisition and the loading of the ortho-
graphic input lexicon, whereas the developmental or early-onset
cases did not have the chance to fill up their orthographic lexicon.
To conclude, selective impairments that indicate the modular
nature of developmental disorders are reported both in SLI and
in peripheral dyslexias. Additional errors can result from the lack
of lexical knowledge rather than lack of Residual Normality.
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Abstract: Either genetically specified modular cognitive architecture for
syntactic processing does not exist (neuroconstructivism), or there is a
module but its development is so abnormal in Williams syndrome (WS)
that no conclusion can be drawn about its normal architecture (moderate
nativism). Radical nativism, which holds that WS is a case of intact syntax,
is untenable. Specific Language Impairment and WS create a dilemma
that radical nativism cannot accommodate.
Nativists about syntax argue that syntax (1) is innate; (2) depends
on rule-based processing; (3) is modularised; and (4) Williams syn-
drome (WS) and Specific Language Impairment (SLI) are a dou-
ble dissociation (DD) which identifies a syntax module damaged
in SLI and “spared” in WS. Thus, Pinker explains the presence of
inflectional morphology in WS as follows:
Their grammar is running smoothly but their word-fetcher doesn’t have
the usual bias to fetch frequent and appropriate words quickly. Irregu-
lar verbs survive on that basis, so occasionally an irregular form doesn’t
survive quickly enough and the rule is ready and waiting to step in.
(Pinker 1999, p. 262)
The word-fetcher is a memory system whose functioning is sta-
tistical, not rule-based (hence the salience of irregulars), whereas
the grammar module, presumed intact in WS, is a rule-based sys-
tem. Nativists model the interaction of these two systems in a dual-
route neural network which stores and retrieves stems and regu-
lar and irregular suffixes. If the word-fetcher cannot find an
irregular suffix, the default regularisation mechanism automati-
cally produces the regular construction.
Karmiloff-Smith and neuroconstructivist collaborators have un-
dermined point 4 by producing a model that captures the linguis-
tic performance of SLI and WS subjects in a single-route network
whose functioning is statistical. The network approximates the lin-
guistic performance of SLI if the noise/signal ratio in phonologi-
cal input is increased and WS if the pattern is reversed and the sig-
nal/noise ratio is increased.
These findings have different consequences for different forms
of nativism. They strongly undermine a reading of point 4 which
depends on Residual Normality (RN). Heather van der Lely, for
example, has argued that in SLI subjects have “normal cognitive
and auditory abilities alongside impaired grammatical abilities”
(van der Lely 1999, p. 286).
Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith (T&K-S) point out, however, that
performing within the normal range on standard tests is not suf-
ficient to justify the RN hypothesis of spared or intact function. In
the case of phonological processing, fine-grained testing can dis-
close subtle deficits with major developmental consequences. For
example, in the extraction of a signal from a variable acoustic
stream, temporal interval as well as amplitude can affect perfor-
mance. Hence, a standard hearing test may not detect subtle
deficits in the ability to overcome the masking effects of the sur-
rounding stream. One explanation of dyslexia is that it is primar-
ily a result of such basic processing deficits rather than a problem
with higher-level linguistic processing (Nagarajan et al. 1999;
Wright et al. 1997a; 1997b). Normal can thus mean “test within
the normal range,” or (the RN hypothesis) “processed by the same
mechanism(s) in the same way as normal subjects.” It is this sense
of normality as RN which is required by van der Lely.
A nativist cannot accept T&K-S’s data and abandon RN without
abandoning the hypothesis that WS and SLI are a DD which iden-
tifies a syntax module. A nativist might initially argue that SLI is a
consequence of impairment to the syntax module, but then they
face a dilemma regarding WS. Is the module intact in WS? If it is,
why do language and syntax have an unusual developmental tra-
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jectory in WS? (Donnai & Karmiloff-Smith 2000; Laing et al.
2002). Possibly, increased sensitivity to phonology overrides the
default mechanism for regularisation. So a WS subject’s syntax
module develops abnormally because the syntax module is
crowded out. However, if this is the case, RN must be abandoned.
Points 1 to 3 can be maintained, but point 4 cannot.
The nativist who abandons point 4 might then argue that ab-
normal syntax in WS is the result of absence of the syntax module.
But in that case, WS should resemble SLI, when in fact they pre-
sent initially as a DD. So the best nativist hypothesis is to abandon
point 4 and retain the idea that what we see in WS is the anom-
alous development rather than absence of a syntax module. But
distinguishing between these two hypotheses on the grounds of
performance alone seems very difficult.
On either story – and the former is the most plausible – it seems
that a nativist must eventually agree that apparent linguistic flu-
ency in WS is essentially due to nonsyntactic factors, and hence
that whatever the fate of nativism about syntax, the hypothesis of
RN for SLI or WS is unsustainable.
The radical neuroconstructivist conclusion is, of course, that na-
tivist modular hypotheses about high-level cognitive processing
such as syntax or theory of mind are mistaken. The appearance of
such modularity is an artefact of interactive development of gen-
eral cognition and low-level processing modules (in this case,
phonology; in the theory-of-mind case, perhaps functions such as
recognition of emotional and facial expression and intentional
movement) (Gerrans 2002; 2003; Gerrans & McGeer, 2003).
The nice thing about T&K-S’s article is that it shows that the
resolution of the issue requires a theory that models the neural im-
plementation of computational properties considered essential to
processing the domain in question. A simple inference from per-
formance to cognitive architecture of high-level, abstract cogni-
tion is not licensed by the data.
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useful and compatible with accounts of
compensatory processing in developmental
disorders of cognition
Nancy Ewald Jacksona and Max Coltheartb
aDepartment of Educational Psychology, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA
52242; bMacquarie Center for Cognitive Science, Macquarie University,
Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia. nancy-jackson@uiowa.edu
max@maccs.mq.edu.au http://www.rosella.bhs.mq.edu.au/~max/
Abstract: Models of the architecture of mature cognitive systems can in-
form the study of normal and disordered cognitive development, if one
distinguishes between proximal and distal causes of performance. The as-
sumption of residual normality need not be made in order to apply adult
models to performance early in development, because these models can
be modified to reflect the results of compensatory processing.
Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith (T&K-S) agreed with us (Jackson &
Coltheart 2001; hereafter J&C) that one can distinguish proximal
causes of abnormal performance (explanations in terms of the cur-
rent architecture of a cognitive system) from distal causes (a cat-
egory in which we include everything else, including develop-
mental history). J&C argued that this proximal-distal distinction
permits models of the architecture of mature cognitive systems to
inform the study of normal and disordered cognitive develop-
ment. We did not assert that adult models should be assumed ad-
equate to describe children’s behavior or used to restrict the
search for differences between developmental and acquired im-
pairments. However, we remain convinced that models of mature
performance are useful starting points for describing both typical
and atypical performance during the development of skills such as
reading. For example, if T&K-S had not been familiar with dual-
route models of skilled performance, would they have attempted
to falsify a hypothesis of similarity between early- and late-dam-
aged systems?
We have not assumed that those components in an abnormally
developing system that are not directly implicated in abnormal
performance will show Residual Normality (RN). On the contrary,
we explicitly disavowed the assumption of RN in developing sys-
tems. Indeed, rather than arguing for RN, we proposed that: “[i]n
a developing system, single deficits might be more likely to have
broad implications than is the case when a previously intact sys-
tem has been damaged” (J&C, p. 152), and went on to speculate
about ways in which impaired development of either a lexical or
nonlexical route might cause problems throughout a child’s de-
veloping reading system:
If each kind of deficit impedes development, we should not be sur-
prised to find that children who are atypical at exception-word reading
often are atypical at pseudoword reading, and vice versa, even though
these two tasks depend on different parts of the reading system. If what
we have proposed about how learning based on each route’s operations
contributes to the development of the other route is true, we would ex-
pect deficits in both types of reading to be the most common, but not
the invariable pattern. Indeed this is what has been found. (J&C, p. 193)
What, then, of T&K-S’s claim that inferences from observed be-
havior to underlying cognitive structure must be conditional on
“developmental constraints under which processing structures
have emerged” (sect. 10, para. 4)? Given the likelihood of com-
pensatory processing in early-damaged systems, how can models
of skilled cognition be useful for understanding developmental
disorders?
T&K-S assumed that static models cannot deal with phenom-
ena such as compensatory processing. They argued that if RN
does not hold, then behaviors that appear similarly intact in ac-
quired and developmental disorders could reflect operation of an
intact processing module in the acquired case but qualitatively
different compensatory processing in the developmental case. But
what constitutes a qualitative difference? Is compensatory pro-
cessing at a particular point in development really beyond the
scope of nondevelopmental models such as the Dual Route Cas-
caded Model of Word Recognition and Reading Aloud, or DRC
(Coltheart et al. 2001)? We counter that it is not and that quanti-
tative changes in how the parameters of such a model are set can
alter its function in a way that might be called strategic and com-
pensatory.
For example, Rastle and Coltheart (1999; see also J&C) showed
that the DRC model can simulate strategic effects that might oc-
cur if a reader expected to read only nonwords. This is not a de-
velopmental scenario; but such tuning of system parameters is
analogous to what might happen if a child’s prior experience in us-
ing either the lexical or the nonlexical route of a modular system
like DRC had been repeatedly unsuccessful. J&C also sketched
how the DRC might be modified to simulate the effects of the re-
stricted orthographic lexicon and incomplete knowledge of
grapheme-phoneme correspondence rules that characterize nor-
mal beginning readers (J&C, Fig. 5.1). The extent to which a mod-
ified version of a static model such as the DRC might account for
observed reading performance at different points in development
is an empirical question that has already been answered in the af-
firmative in some instances (Coltheart et al. 2001, Fig. 15).
Static models such as DRC say nothing about processes by
which reading systems change over time as children develop read-
ing ability. Nonetheless, such models can offer successive snap-
shots of what the system might look like, for normal and impaired
readers, as reading develops. However, given that static models do
not seek to explain processes of development, why do we still pre-
fer such models to apparently more comprehensive and undoubt-
edly more dynamic connectionist models? To answer this ques-
tion, we return to the distinction between proximal and distal
cause.
Distal causes that have been proposed for developmental read-
ing failure are diverse, ranging from genetic anomalies to restric-
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